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 Talk by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to the Anhwei Delegation

Talk by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to the Anhwei Delegation

CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO

* Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, from SCMP No. 4145 (March 25, 1968), pp. 1-8.

Comrade K'ang has asked me to talk about the "January Revolution" in Shanghai and how the seizure of power came to take place. I will try to do so in the hope that it may be of some help to your judgment of the seizure of power and to the solution of your problems. However, because the situation in Shanghai then was not the same, it cannot be wholly applicable in your case.
 The mobilization of the masses in the "January Revolution" in Shanghai was the same as in other parts of the country. Because the old Shanghai Municipal Party Committee had misled the masses to a serious extent, the masses there were mobilized a little later than those in other localities. This is particularly true of the workers as only a few of them rose in rebellion until August-September. Even by October, only several thousand rebels stepped forth out of a total of more than a million industrial workers. At a rally of rebel organizations formed throughout the city held in early November, more than a million people attended. Actually, some of the participants were conservatives and people secretly planted by the old municipal Party committee to watch how things were going at the rally; only five thousand were genuine rebels.

During November-December, the mass movement in Shanghai appeared to have gained momentum to an appreciable extent. There were fierce struggles between both factions which were equally matched in strength. The main force in Shanghai stemmed from the workers who made up two major factions, namely the rebels called the "Workers' Rebel H.Q."—a force of several thousand people that had grown to fifty to sixty thousand strong, and the "Workers' Red Militia Detachment" which claimed to have a following of eighty thousand strong, a contingent of at least fifty to sixty thousand people. The two factions were equally matched in strength, explaining the reason why massive armed clashes were rife between them. By the end of December, however, the "Workers' Red Militia Detachment" had collapsed. At this juncture, the revolutionaries had the workers as the backbone plus revolutionary Red Guards and cadres of public organs. By the end of December, the revolutionary peasants on the outskirts of Shanghai had also come forward, thus spontaneously forming an alliance with the revolutionary workers.
 The situation in Shanghai then was excellent because the "Workers' Red Militia Detachment" and the Red Guards antagonistic to the revolutionary workers had collapsed while the conservatives of public organs had not yet formed an alliance. Under these circumstances, the old municipal Party committee resorted to "economism" [money and material inducements] to corrupt and disintegrate the rebels among the workers.
 I recall going to Shanghai with Comrade Yao Wen-yuan on January 4. The old municipal Party committee had then been paralyzed. Many factories, including vital industrial plants, had stopped production. The stoppage of operations of Kao-chiao Chemical Works led many other plants to halt production. The piers and railway stations were also immobilized, causing severe dislocations. Under such circumstances, the revolutionary rebels in Shanghai began to seize power [from those holding power in the old Shanghai Municipal Party Committee].
 In the early stage of the seizure of power in Shanghai, we never thought of the "capture of power" nor did we use the words "January Revolution." We proceeded in the main from the Party spirit with no thought of factionalism. This is because we saw with our own eyes stoppages of work in industrial plants, and the piers were in such a state of paralysis that foreign vessels entering Shanghai harbor were unable to unload or load cargoes. Taking advantage of the situation, imperialists lost no time in broadcasting to the world, saying that wharf workers in Shanghai went on strike. They did so with the malicious intention to attack and slander us. Some foreign merchant ships displayed our national flag upside down. This greatly irritated the rebels and wharf workers.
 Because large numbers of members of the "Workers' Red Militia Detachment" quit their jobs after drawing their pay, many [revolutionary] workers worked for several days on end without leaving their jobs, instead of working the usual eight-hour shift or sixteen-hour [double] shifts. Railway stations were also manned by a skeleton staff and only two runs were scheduled each day. Sometimes, not even a single train was run.
 At the time, we were not motivated by factionalism nor did we think of recapturing power [from the power-holders]. What was uppermost in our minds was what we were going to do [about the widespread dislocations]. After discussing the situation as a whole, we set about putting the vital departments such as the piers, railway stations, waterworks, power plants, broadcasting stations, postal offices and banks under our control. We did so to prevent counter-revolutionary acts of sabotage. Therefore, we mobilized troops and students and the rebels of industrial plants and railway stations to assist the revolutionary workers.
   In the case of the Shanghai Railway Bureau, for instance, the: rebels of railway stations with the assistance of thousands of college students manned the ticket booths and entry points to platforms, or served as locomotive conductors and train attendants. The students of practically all secondary schools in Shanghai were busy at the piers helping to load or unload cargoes. To get these workers organized, a joint command was set up not for seizing power on behalf of this or that faction, but for the sake of class interests, for the honor of the fatherland, for the socialist economy and for repelling the counterattack of bourgeois "economism."
 We submitted a report to the Center on the situation in Shanghai and what steps we had taken. Chairman Mao endorsed our actions, telling us that the seizure of power was wholly necessary and correct. This is how we came to use the term "seizure of power" as suggested by Chairman Mao.
 However, at the mention of "seizure of power," we found the resultant evils of factionalism, such as selfishness, obsession with personal gain, the "mountain stronghold" mentality, the "small group" mentality, sectarianism, and so forth. This is because when those people were subjected to oppression or branded as "counter-revolutionary," they hardly noticed these evils. But once the moment for the seizure of power came, some people became obsessed with selfishness and the "mountain stronghold" mentality.
 The seizure of power in Shanghai was not just plain sailing because once petit-bourgeois factionalism came to the fore, it was detrimental to the proletarian Party spirit and upset the general orientation of struggle. . . .
 ... As a result of our prodding, meetings were held many times in early February to approve of the professed plans for the seizure of power by the thirty-eight recognized rebel organizations. At these sessions, we made it clear that the seizure of power [from persons in power] in no way involved the seizure of official seals or occupation of the premises of official establishments. Rather, it involved the issues as to whether or not Chairman Mao's revolutionary line was carried out, great alliances forged, the interests of the broad masses of people represented and popular support secured. We also made it clear that the seizure of official seals would be of no avail and in the absence of popular recognition of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the Shanghai Municipal People's Council, occupation of their offices would also be of no avail—merely a manifestation of formalism. We sold them: Sukarno held a baton symbolizing presidential powers: nonetheless, Suharto stripped Sukarno of all his powers. What is the use of carrying the baton again?
 In the joint seizure of power by the thirty-eight organizations, the great majority of organizations in Shanghai had in the main formed alliances. The situation was quite favorable because all the prominent rebel organizations in the city took part. At the time when the thirty-eight organizations met to draft a document for the formation of the "Shanghai People's Commune," another twenty-five organizations also met to inaugurate their "New Shanghai People's Commune." They told their rivals: Since you people haven't asked us to join your setup, we call ours "New Shanghai People's Commune"—something newer than yours!
 The problem which confronted us then was that two major factions would be formed. The thirty-eight organizations were in the majority, being undisputed rebel groups. On the other hand, the twenty-five organizations were in the minority, having quarreled among themselves by calling one another conservative organizations. What was to be done in such a situation? If we proceeded from factional considerations when tackling the matter, deep rifts would inevitably occur. However, if we proceeded from fundamental class interests, from the interests of socialism, from the interests of all our people, and from considerations of the Party spirit, internal rifts would be avoided.
 If the thirty-eight organizations proclaimed their readiness to seize power then and there, opposition would almost certainly arise and the factions in opposition to the thirty-eight organizations would not stop struggling against them, reminding us of what happened in Anhwei and Kiangsu (Comrade K'ang: Rifts will result if the seizure of power is undertaken by one faction and not jointly with other factions).
   In these circumstances, we held fast to the general orientation of struggle in accordance with Chairman Mao's established policies and instructions of uniting the majority and relying on the majority. This general orientation must not be abandoned when uniting the revolutionary forces and struggling against the capitalist roaders. This is because once our own ranks were thrown into disarray in an unsuccessful seizure of power, the capitalist roaders would only be too pleased. Therefore, we tackled the matter in two stages, first dealing with the thirty-eight organizations which had formed the "Shanghai People's Commune" because they were backed by solid strength and were numerically superior to other groups.
 We told them: Do you people think it is right to do it this way and is the general orientation in order? They replied: Since seizing power from the capitalist roaders is in keeping with the general orientation, it is of course right for us to do so. But can we say we are keeping to the correct general orientation after splitting our own ranks as a result of the seizure of power? What you have said is right. Have they done the right thing by seizing power from the capitalist roaders and forming the "New Shanghai People's Commune"? Who will benefit from this? Some people then said those were smaller organizations which could be smashed to pieces overnight and therefore it really didn't matter much at all.
 We told them: If you people do it this way, the power you people have wrested won't last long because nobody will accept you.
 Later, we submitted a report to the center and proposed the following measures to the two rival factions:
 First, we suggested changing the thirty-eight component units making up the "Shanghai People's Commune" to proposing units, in this way leaving the door open to the other twenty-odd units after subjecting them to gradual stages of screening.
 Second, a notice should be inserted in the newspapers tomorrow, but none of the proposing units will identify itself with the inserted announcement so as not to be mixed up with the seizure of power on behalf of a particular unit or with the desire to seek limelight. The first Message to the People of Shanghai which appeared in newspapers was issued by eleven units approved by Chairman Mao. That message made quite an impression on the public. The second Message to the People of Shanghai, however, was not made known to the public until the twenty-odd units which drafted the notice had vehemently wrangled over the order the names of the individual organizations should follow the message. Quarrels went out of hand and at one point the contenders for precedence over others disputed so furiously that they almost closed down the Wenhui Pao, indicating the serious extent of factionalism. Therefore, proclamations are not to be inserted in newspapers to avoid fomenting factionalism.
 Third, at the inaugural meeting, delegates from organizations big and small or proposing or non-proposing units should be seated in the presidium. This is to unite the majority.
 Fourth, regardless of what organizations, conservative or otherwise, they are from, the people of Shanghai (Comrade K'ang: the citizens of Shanghai) have the right to attend celebration rallies or take part in processions. The conservatives are welcome whether they attend celebration rallies or take part in processions. In fact, all are welcome so long as they are not our enemies or landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists. In this way, the majority is unite After this was done, dealing with the other twenty-five organizations posed no problems at all. Because the proposing uni made allowance for other organizations to join them after screening by stages, no feelings were ruffled. Consequently, steps were not taken to form the "New Shanghai People's Commune."

Of course, it wasn't easy at all to convert these people to our point of view. For instance, some people clamored for inclusion on the next day and considered themselves as proposing units and so had the right to be seated in the presidium. We had to hold repeated negotiations with them. Fortunately, we then had a "trump card" in our hands, for the Center designated myself and Comrade Yao Wen-yuan to be members of the "Shanghai People's Commune." Since there could be only one and not two organs of power in Shanghai, we could only join one. Incidentally, the three services of the army could not possibly support two organs of power because if they were asked to support both organs of power they would certainly lose heart. Of course, that wasn't final and what was a matter of decisive importance was none other than Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. In short, what the editorial of the February issue of Hung-ch'i journal stressed was a call to the proletarian revolutionaries to unite and to seize power from the handful of Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road.

   In the congratulatory message sent on January 11 to the people of Shanghai by the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Central Military Commission and the Central Cultural Revolution Group, there was this line: "You have formed a revolutionary great alliance, thus putting firmly in your hands the destiny of the great proletarian cultural revolution, the destiny of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the destiny of the socialist economy." ...
 The reason why the situation in Shanghai was under control without showing any serious signs of rift was not that problems did not crop up among proletarian revolutionary organizations; rather, various mass organizations were able to handle problems correctly whenever they had cropped up in accordance with Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and on the basis of guidelines laid down by the Party Center. Otherwise, Shanghai would have been seriously divided as in other [trouble spots]. Since we made a practice of handling and resolving problems in accordance with Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the question of Shanghai was rather successfully resolved and the situation there stabilized.
 Arriving in Shanghai in the course of his inspection tour, Chairman Mao said: Why is Shanghai so stabilized? Well, barring other factors, the relationships between the masses and the cadres and between the masses and the Liberation Army were rather good. Between the masses themselves, between the masses and the cadres, and between the masses and the Liberation Army, the relationship was one of uniting with one another, not in opposition to one another. Under the condition of keeping to the same general orientation, if problems should crop up, people would sit down and discuss them, go over Chairman Mao's writings, make criticism and self-criticism. That is why no serious rifts occurred then and no major problems cropped up. There were occasional rifts on a minor scale as there were cases in which certain individuals turned bad but nothing abnormal. But on the whole there were no problems of consequence.


  
  
  

 
 
顶端 Posted: 2009-03-16 04:08 | [楼 主]
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中央首长第三次接见安徽双方全体代表时的讲话
康生 张春桥
1967.10.22




中央首长:康生同志、张春桥同志、姚文元同志、李天佑同志。

安徽军管会领导小组钱钧、廖容标、李德生、廖成美、杨广立等同志参加接见。

时间:一九六七年十月卄二日下午四时卄分至六时十分。

地点:人民大会堂安徽厅。



康生同志讲话



我介绍一下,这是张春桥同志,张政委,张春桥同志是文革小组的副组长,也是上海革委会的主任,你们地区也受他管。

同志们,差不多一个多月没有见面了,从九月五日见面以后,领导小组在解决问题,我们搞国庆,迎外宾,现在来开个会了。首先应当说安徽的各地方的代表团在北京的工作做得好,你们响应毛主席革命大联合的号召,做的很好。这方面,代表工作有成绩的,有功劳的,我们中央也好,中央文革小组也好,南京军区的同志也好,完全是支持你们响应毛主席的号召,这种态度我们完全支持的。听说你们的代表回去的时候,群众还有些不能谅解。说你们到北京“修”了,或者是变了,群众还不了解嘛。这不要紧,这说明我们要很快的回去向群众做工作。我是听说,对不对不晓得。有的同志回去,人家要斗他,这一点,你们精神要准备一下。但我觉得,你们的方针方向对嘛,中央支持你们嘛,毛主席赞成你们,你们的联合,毛主席批发给全国嘛,这一条就可以增强你们的信心了。总的方面看,你们的代表工作做得好的。

安徽文化大革命形势同全国一样,都是大好形势,但大好形势中不是没有问题了。你们代表团,每个地区达成了几条协议,全省整个的你们又达成了协议。全省的协议你们签字没有签字?(众答:签字了。)现在全省的东西都赞成罗?(众答:赞成)很好罗。我们中央文革小组表示同意你们这个协议,支持你们这个协议,可以向下贯彻罗。将来把签了字的协议中央加个批语。同意你们这个协议,这一点也说明你们工作做得很细,各地代表达成地区协议,全省代表又达成了全省协议,这方面应当说在各省中搞得很好的一个。在大好形势下,当然也有些逆流。特别在安庆、芜湖、蚌埠有,这种反复是正常的。事情有时候是有规律性的反复,但无论如何怎么反复,中央的方针,中央文革的指示,群众会逐渐了解的。因为什么呢?因为主席号召革命大联合嘛。群众是不赞成现在再分几大派,分裂嘛。这个方针是定了,这个方针是不能变的。所以你们安徽的形势,就象主席最近指示的要防止走资派不甘心失败,垂死挣扎罗。想破坏中央的方针,破坏我们的大联合,破坏安徽的大好形势。另外一方面,也有个别的坏人、敌人制造混乱,混淆黑白,颠倒是非,造谣污蔑挑拨。象江青同志九月五日所讲的妄图动摇毛主席领导的中央,毛主席领导的无产阶级司令部,妄图动摇我们的人民解放军,妄图动摇革命群众的大联合,以及新成立的革命委员会。敌人是会有的,你们也知道了。在安徽各地方都有罗,到处贴我的大字报,想打倒我。你们现在看看,我还没有倒。安徽有的利用王力关锋个别同志犯错误来煽动,王力关锋错在那里?恰恰是反对我们的。今天讲,王力关锋是有错误。(呼口号:谁反对康老就打倒谁!)康老笑着说:不一定就打倒。王力关锋他们是反对周总理,反对伯达同志,反对江青同志,反对我。而且揭露他的错误是我们揭露的。现在出现这样的情况。有的人是正确的反对他们的错误,有的企图利用这个东西翻案,把过去的错误东西翻案。个别敌人利用这个东西扰乱我们。这是一种情况。我看安徽各地方受这个影响比较大一些,所以今天讲一下,大好形势下出现这种情况是有的。

安徽文化大革命,毛主席、党中央、中央文革对安徽的文化大革命是极大的关怀的,尤其是我们伟大领袖毛主席。同志们可以想一想,元月卄一日,毛主席亲自批了电报,要支持你们元月卄三号斗争李葆华。正因为这个批语,使全军介入支左的,这是对安徽的头一个批语。你们可以想一想这个东西,另外一方面,中央在三月卄七日和四月一号,发表了一个“九条”、“五条”。“九条”“五条”不仅对安徽起了作用,对全国文化大革命起了很好的作用。你们再看一看,九月五号江青同志的一个讲话,在全国广播。里面讲的也是从安徽问题讲的。另外,由于你们的努力,响应党中央的号召,你们实行大联合,实行自我批评,这个情况很好嘛!合肥这样做,其他的地方马上响应中央的这个号召,结果主席批的嘛,九月卄三日发给全国了,你们这个好的经验,实际上全国学习你们。我说你们代表团工作做得好嘛,这是一个。然后,九月卄六号主席接见,你们军区的同志,十二军的同志接见了嘛!国庆节后,主席亲自提议叫刚果(布)的总理到安徽淮南去特别看一看。那个总理听到主席叫他到淮南看一看。看后很感动地说文化大革命确实是好的。乱一个时期确实乱了敌人,锻炼了群众,一乱问题越清楚,所以国际友人参观,受很大的感动。同时也是安徽的光荣。各地,蚌埠、芜湖、安庆也应该向淮南学习嘛。所有这一些,说明了什么,说明主席对安徽文化大革命给予极大的关怀,极大的支持,中央、中央文革小组对安徽文化大革命极大的支持。主席把你们自我批评,大联合的行动批转全国,提议外宾到你们那里去访问,这应当是安徽所有革命派的极大光荣。因此,我觉得你们更加不要辜负中央的鼓励,更加不要辜负毛主席的鼓励,这是同志们应当时刻的认识的问题。认识以后,掌握主席的思想,更使我们的工作做好。要使我们的大联合做好,有些阻碍大联合的,应当很好克服。有些企图破坏大联合的,就要进行斗争,进行批判。当中有个什么问题呢?我觉得,在国庆节以后,安徽应当注意一下,就是大联合前进得慢。有些地方向后倒退。就是说,派性没有完全彻底的肃清。你们现在两派提出的一些问题,以及各个地区提出的突出问题,两派性质问题,武斗问题,等等问题。如果按照毛主席的最新指示,看起来容易解决,就是说,除掉派性,除掉宗派观点。容易解决的。因此,同志们还必须根据毛主席的号召,斗私批修。“私”字一天不斗,一天还要生长的。所以从斗私批修、大联合当中来看问题,当然这里面有些问题。

安徽的问题,要在结束以前,交待一下。有些要说明一下。所以今天请张政委来,就是感觉到有些同志对上海一月风暴是什么回事不大理解。因此联系到夺权问题。是对还是不对,到底是假夺权,还是大方向是对的。这个问题争论的很尖锐,有时候我们说明。我想张政委亲身指导的上海一月风暴,会使我们得到一个正确的概念的。



张春桥同志讲话



同志们,我刚刚回到北京几天,因为听说今天开会,康老要我来参加。安徽的情况不熟悉,知道一些,但没有实际地参加你们的斗争,总是隔着一层。整个文化大革命期间没有到安徽去,过去接见过个别单位的代表。去年、今年偶然见过一两次。去年八月路过,在蚌埠飞机场停了一下,没有进去。合肥停了三个钟头,在机场休息了一下,马路上看了一眼。情况不大清楚,材料看了一下,特别是“九、五”江青同志讲话以后,安徽的形势发展很快很好,这中间我们看到了一些材料。所以很想向同志们学习。看你们是怎么样来解决自己问题的。

我没有直接到安徽去,但刚果(布)总理到淮南去了以后到上海,我接待他,问他淮南怎么样,他说好。他原来对主席请他到淮南去不理解,有些怕罗,到那里去特别是接触了一些群众,淮南的矿工,干部向他们详细地介绍了淮南文化大革命的情况,他们自己也下了煤矿。非常感动,到了淮南,对中国文化大革命就了解多了。

所以,整个的来看,安徽的形势象刚才康老所说的确实很好,这样的形势到来是很不容易的,是经过长时间的斗争,一年多的斗争。才取得今天这样的一个局面。当然现在并不是一切问题都解决了,也不可能一切问题都解决,矛盾总是存在,旧的矛盾解决了,新的矛盾又产生了,如果要是没有事了,那不可能,没有那么一天。而且越是形势好,越是接近最后胜利的时候,可能还有一番比较尖锐的斗争。这是各个地方都有的,所以现在出现一些问题,我觉得不是什么坏事。各个地方出现一些反复也不是坏事,它可能使我们把问题解决得更彻底一些。所以,现在在蚌埠、安庆、芜湖那些地方出现的局势,没有什么了不起,有的说,代表团在这里“修”了,我觉得这个说法不妥,怎么“修”了?对毛主席的革命路线更加理解了,更加懂得毛主席革命路线,理解得更深了,不是“修”了,而是更加革命了,因为在安徽发生过“一·二六”夺权,合肥是这样的,省里的夺权,还是地委、县都有这个问题,所有这些问题争论不休。要我们对一个地方一个地方表示意见是困难的,又没有做深入的调查,有的地方说,我对那个地方的夺权表示过意见。我应当声明没有这个事。我也不应该表示意见。解决问题都要靠那个地方的群众。

康老要我讲一讲上海一月革命究竟是怎么夺权的,我想可以介绍一下。这样也可能对同志们判断你们自己的问题和今后遇到这些问题有些帮助,但情况不完全一样,也不能完全照搬,因为上海的一月革命是这样的,群众的发动和各地差不多。因为原来的上海市委蒙蔽群众蒙蔽得厉害,群众起来的可能比别的地方还晚一些,特别是工人起来的晚。工人七、八月份很少有造反,到十月底的时候,在这样一百几十万产业工人的大城市里头,属于造反的工人也不过几千人。很少。十月份,他们搞工人造反派组织的时候,到会的一万多人,里头有的是保守派来看看的,有的是市委派的暗探混到里面去的,真正的造反派最多不过五千人。从十一月、十二月两个月里面,上海的群众运动比较大规模的发展起来了,斗争很激烈,双方的力量都很强。那个时候上海的主要队伍是工人队伍,工人是两大派,一个是是造反派,叫“工人革命造反司令部”,从几千人到十二月初发展到五、六十万人;他的对立面——“工人赤卫队”,号称八十万,但总有五、六十万,旗鼓相当,势均力敌,大规模的武斗不断,这样一直搞到十二月底,“赤卫队”垮台了,而在这个过程里面,革命派以工人为主力军,再加上革命红卫兵,机关干部,到十二月,革命的农民也起来了,这样各方面的革命群众在斗争里面发展起来。而且在斗争中自然地形成大联合,这个联合已经形成了。因为最大的革命工人对立面“赤卫队”垮了,机关造反派的对立面就是保守派,根本没有形成,组织没有来得及形成。所以形势是非常好的。在这样的情况下,旧上海市委就搞经济主义来企图瓦解革命造反派。我和姚文元同志是元月四号到上海的。我们到上海那个时候的局面,市委和人委完全瘫痪了,很多工厂停工了,非常多的重要工厂停工了,有的时候一个工厂停工,如高桥化工厂,它一个工厂停工,带动了上十个工厂停工,因为原料要靠它,它停了,别的工厂要停下来。码头停了,火车停了,这个时候局势很困难,造反派处在很重的压力下,在这样的情况下,上海的革命造反派开始夺权,我们在刚刚开始夺权的时候,我们根本没有用“夺权”两个字,也没有用“一月革命”,这些名字都没有。完全是从什么出发的呢?那真是从党性出发的,毫无派性,怎么叫从党性出发呢?就是眼看码头瘫痪在那里。每天外国轮船到上海港又不能装又不能卸,帝国主义利用这样的情况,向全世界广播:说上海码头工人罢工了,对我们进行污蔑攻击,有些帝国主义国家的船,把我们的国旗倒挂着,造反派的码头工人气急了,好多工人已经连续上班,不是什么八小时,也不是十二小时。而是几天不下班,特别紧张,因为大批赤卫队走了,拿了市委给的钱跑了,造反派顶着。铁路也是这样,有的一天开出两列车,有时一天一列车也未出去。那个时候夺权是没有派性,也没有想到夺权。就是对这样的局面怎么办,我们自己商量我们自己干,首先把自来水厂、发电厂、报社、邮电局、电台、码头……控制在自己手里,不让反革命捣乱,这些单位造反派很少,调动学生去,有的工厂造反派多,任务不急,就把那里的造反派调去,支援铁路局造反派,加之上千的大学生,去做检票员、售票员、列车员,码头,几乎所有的大学生、中学生赶去装卸,为了把这个工作组织起来,因此,组织了联合指挥部,因为要有权力机构,就这样夺的权,不是为那一派,不是为那个组织,而完全是为了阶级的利益,为了我们祖国的荣誉,为了社会主义的经济,为了打退资产阶级反动路线的反扑。他们用经济主义,对文化大革命进行反扑。为了这些才夺权的,我们把这些情况向中央报告了,毛主席肯定了这些行动,认为从文汇报开始的夺权是完全正确的,必要的,这样毛主席才提出。但提出夺权以后,派性、自私自利,山头主义、小团体主义,就发作起来,当自己受压迫的时候,被人家打成反革命的时候,没有想的东西,或者在那个时候,在脑子里不是起主导作用的东西,到这样时候,要夺权了,私心杂念就来了,山头主义这一套就来了。

上海的夺权也不是那样顺利的,因为这些东西出来了。这些东西一出来,派性一出来,就要破坏无产阶级党性,就要冲击干扰大方向,我们这里夺权夺了多少次,我们原来想,我和姚文元同志商量,先把要害部门、经济部门,先把它控制起来,造反派掌握起来,这样对保证全市一千万人民的生活,比较能够不致于搞得太坏,同时保证上海对全国经济的影响,不要搞的影响太大,该生产的东西,能够继续生产,供应全国。至于市委市人委的权,我们慢一点搞,因为实际这个权,已经在我们手里。那么采取什么形式呢?就是开代表大会,发动上海造反派,派代表来商量。今天干什么,明天干什么,那个时候没有什么形式,什么组织都没有,就是开会嘛。今天来可能四十个组织,下次××个组织。有时屋里越来越多,有的时候说不行,来的保守派要请他走。革命嘛,就是这样忙忙碌碌的,用这样的方式,我们觉得可以解决问题,不要急。不多久,元月十五号发生了第一次夺权了,我讲的夺权是夺市一级的次,两个组织,一个是工人组织,一个是红卫兵组织。他们夺权没有和我们商量,突然跑到市委书记处院子里把人召集起来,发布一个通告,说我们夺了市委、市人委的权。那么这样的事情怎么办呢?我们一方面把他们情况报告中央,一方面找来这两个组织代表来谈话,这个时候感觉到派性来了,红卫兵组织代表,他宣布接管市委、市人委,我们下午才知道的。我们找他谈话的时候,他已经坐飞机到北京去报喜去了,我们只好找到工人组织的代表。我们都很熟悉,说你们怎么就这样夺起来了,也应该跟我们商量一下,这样夺了以后,谁听你的。说怎么办呢?我们说,还是要联合夺权,如果政权夺到手里,广大群众不支持你,说话没有用的,没有人听的,夺等于不夺。还好,这位同志接受了我们的意见,说我们的通告光念了一念还没有贴出去,我们说你们是不是可以收回,说可以收回不贴。第一次夺权无效,过了两天,另外四个组织,这四个组织代表了上海造反派绝大多数,一个工总司,一个红革会,一个机关联络站,还有一个农民组织,那天晚上夺权,预先不给我们打招呼,把市委、市人委、区委,区人委的印,华东局的印,一个晚上统统收完,他们带着包子坐汽车到处取印,通告准备好,宣布夺了华东局、市委,市人委、区委、区人委的权,这个夺的彻底啦!通告送到报社,要文汇报、解放日报登,要他们明天一定要豋。我们怎么知道的,是报社打电话问我们,说明天有两个通告能不能豋,我们还不知道怎么一回事,问那几个组织,说四个组织夺了权,我们两个商量一下,这样不行,这样搞夺权是夺不下来的,而且夺了无效,我们和报社那个同志说,坚决不同意发表这两个通告,你们无论如何不能豋。由我们负责说服这四个组织,把他们夺权计划改变一下,给这四家说,可难了,他们四家如果联合起来,别的组织都是小组织,他们是大多数,别的组织不在话下,现在还是这样,工总司一动,全市就动了,势力大。后来因为这些造反派和我们的关系比较好,总还是说服了他们,这样不行,你们四家搞联络站也可以,现在宣布夺权,是关系到全市人民的问题,不光是造反派,(康老插话:他是政权性质的)我说,这样不和所有造反派商量一下,这样要闹分裂的。搞了好几个钟头,姚文元同志在那打电话。一个电话一个电话的打。这次还好算是说服了,这是第三次(原话如此)第四次呢?(康老插话:假使那一次不改变上海不会象现在这样,还会是分裂的局面)是呀!我下面还要说,第一次夺权的红卫兵组织代表不是到北京报喜去了吗?到北京不知听了什么谣言,说可以这样做,说总理有四点指示,陈伯达同志有四点指示,到处散发,说中央决定几条几条。

我们说怪了,我们一天和中央打几次电话联系非常密切,怎么不知道呢?为这个事,专门给总理打电话,他们说总理接见了他们,专门做了几点指示,总理说根本没有这回事,那里有什么指示,他就拿了所谓什么总理指示,又去夺权,又联合了几个小组织,上一次和他一块夺权的那个工人组织没有参加,这个夺权更没有人支持,连工人组织都没有参加仍然无效。相反的遭到最大造反派的反对,这是第四次,又是无效。第五次,因为经过四次,我们反复向大家讲,夺权不能一个人搞的,要搞我们一块干,前一段都是一块干的嘛,现在为什么一部份人去干了呢?在中央推动下,到了二月初,比你们一·二六夺权就晚了,反复开会,大家共同承认的造反派组织卅八个单位,宣布联合夺权,老实说,如果夺权从形式上夺,有什么好夺,占了房子就算夺权了,拿了图章就算夺权了,都是形式的。要看是不是代表毛主席革命路线,是不是代表广大人民利益,是不是得到广大人民拥护,是这个问题,少数单位去夺权夺了没用。那样图章都拿去了没有用。因为那个时候,盖市委、市人委图章,人家都不承认,图章没有什么用,占领了市委、市人委大楼有什么用,那才是形式呢,象苏加诺手里拿的棍,谁拿那个棍子,就象征了权力,苏哈托夺了他的权,棍子还有什么用?卅八个组织联合夺权,基本上把上海造反派大多数联合了,这样比较好。象以前夺法,夺了不如不夺,势必造成分裂,打内战。到这个时候,卅八个组织都是有名的,所有造反派统统参加,就是这卅八个组织在开会讨论宣言的时候,有人报告我们说,另外卄五个组织,在另外地方开,准备成立另外的机构。我们那个时候研究成立上海人民公社,另外卄多个组织开会讨论说,不叫我们参加,那我们叫“新上海人民公社”,比你们还新。这个局面摆在我们面前,上海立刻形成两大派,就在夺权当中两大派出现了。当然上海人民公社占绝大多数。而且都是没有争论的造反派。那卄几个组织有争论。比如说这卅八个组织对他们讨论时,有的说是保守派,有的说不是保守派,没有定论。这种情况下怎么办?如果这个时候从派性出发,那就是要造反派大分裂,如果从无产阶级根本利益,从社会主义经济根本利益,从无产阶级的利益,从全国的利益,就是说从党性出发,那就不能形成这个分裂,如果形成这个分裂,这卅八个单位你即使夺了权,你今天一宣布我夺了权,对立面立刻就出现,天天跟你斗,我看你们安徽就是这个样子。江苏有些地方也是这个样子。江苏也是一·二六夺权,在这种情况下,我们再三考虑,根据毛主席一贯的方针,对我们过去的指示,总是有个依靠大多数团结大多数问题。总是有个坚持大方向联合各个革命组织力量,向走资派进行斗争,这个大方向不能动摇的。无论如何不能把我们队伍搞乱,组织分裂,那样反而夺权不好,走资派很高兴,因为内战要打起来了嘛,这种情况下,我们就向两方面作工作,首先向准备成立上海人民公社的卅八个单位做工作,因为他们是实力派,队伍最大。我们和他们说,说这样行不行,你们这样夺权行呀,一夺你说大方向对不对。当然也可以说大方向对,但这样夺,立刻就会分裂自己的队伍,这样的大方向对吗?他们也可以说,我们搞新上海人民公社大方向也对,但我们的队伍分裂了,这算什么大方向对呢?究竟对谁有利呢?他们也感觉到是个问题,当然也有点感觉不在乎,那卄几个是小组织,有的说,可以在一个晚上给他砸掉。不准备联合更多的力量,我们说这样就是夺了权也是掌不住的,人家不承认,光靠自己去承认了。后来他们说怎么办,这个我们也请示了中央,报告了中央,后来我们就给他们提出这样一些建议。

第一、把38个单位他们原来叫上海人民公社组成单位,我们说不叫组成单位,叫人民公社发起单位。那二十几个单位还有其他的单位逐步的加以审查,然后再来参加。这样不会造成两大派,也不会造成对立。改成发起单位这是第一;第二、明天登报的话,那些单位是发起单位不登报,一个也不登,不搞这一套。我们为阶级夺权,不是为团体夺权,不出这个风头。因为上海第一次告全市人民书是11个单位,中央一批,毛主席一批,这样可起劲了,而且那个组织名字在先那个组织名字在后都争,而且要封文汇报,说为什么把我的名字放在最后,那个派性很厉害,所以登报名字一个也不登,他们也赞成了。另外,开成立大会的时候,不管是发起单位或者不是发起单位,都允许有代表上主席台,这个也同意了。再加一条,因为是成立大会又是庆祝大会,不管那个组织,包括保守派,如果愿意来参加大会,都可以,因为是庆祝大会么,他是公民嘛,也有权来参加庆祝会,有权来参加游行,说我们拥护你这个政权,这个样再都不同意,理由讲不出去的。所以我们说如果愿意来参加庆祝大会的都欢迎。参加游行也欢迎,只要不是敌人,不是地富反坏右都欢迎。因此,这样就团结了绝大多数的人。这是对这一方我们做的工作,因为这一工作作通了,和那二十几个单位做工作比较好办了,因为是发起单位嘛,而且夺权通告上写清了一条,只是发起单位,其余的组织陆续审查参加,这样他们没有气了,虽然有争论嘛。这样新上海人民公社就没有搞。当然也不是很容易说服的。他们说,明天就要参加。我们说,可以上主席台,他们说要算发起单位。我们说怎么办呢?我们不好说,他们不赞成嘛,只能协商,一次协商不行,二次嘛,反复的协商嘛。那个时候我和姚文元同志手里有一张王牌,我们和二十几个单位说,中央已经批准我们参加上海人民公社,我们不能参加你们的公社,上海只能有一个政权,不能有两个政权,同时上海驻军决定支持上海人民公社,不能支持两个,这样他们也泄气了。

上海的一月革命,毛主席加以总结,正如红旗杂志一月份二月份讲的,概括一句话,就是“无产阶级革命派联合起来,向党内一小撮走资本主义道路的当权派手里夺权。”中共中央、国务院、中央军委和中央文革小组给上海各革命造反派发的贺电里面有一段话,就是“你们实行了无产阶级革命派组织的大联合……把无产阶级专政的命运,无产阶级文化大革命的命运,把社会主义经济的命运,紧紧掌握在自己手里。”我们11号看到贺电后,反复宣传中央的这个观点,就是要大联合,背离了这一个方针,那就背离了毛主席的革命路线,因为不是联合夺权,这个夺权不会巩固的,不能行使权力的,说了话没有人听,至少对立面是不听的,离开了这条路线,那样就只能带来分裂、内战,资产阶级很高兴,小资产阶级派性大发作,所以,我们的经验归纳起来还是中央原来说的,无产阶级革命派联合起来向走资派夺权。

上海的局势所以比较好,所以没有分裂,不是上海革命派内部各个群众组织之间没有发生过矛盾,没有发生过问题,而是各个群众组织在遇到了这些问题的时候,根据毛主席的路线,根据党中央的方针,正确地处理了这些矛盾,如果不是正确地处理这些矛盾,采取别的方针,那上海会要分裂的。一月二月三月都是可以分裂,后来还有很多次,也是可以分裂的,但我们总是用毛主席的思想来处理这些问题,解决的比较好,所以上海现在就比较稳定。这一次毛主席视察各地到了上海,说到上海的情况,他又一次的强调了这个问题,说上海为什么比较稳定呢?除了其他的原因,很重要的就是上海群众、干部和解放军这三者的关系比较好。革命群众之间的关系也比较好,群众、干部和解放军三结合方面是结合的,而不是互相反对。大家在大方向一致的前提下,发生了问题坐下来学习毛主席著作,进行批评和自我批评,用这样的方法来解决我们的问题,所以一直到现在没有发生大的分裂,小的分裂总是有的,个别的人变坏,那总是有的,没有是不正常的,但总的没有大的变化。

我介绍一段经过,无非是希望同志们考虑考虑你们那里的问题。因为争论嘛,我很难发表意见,我是希望双方,争论夺权的双方,都来考虑这个问题,究竟采取什么办法解决这个矛盾?因为各个地方的矛盾不完全一样,你们那里几个城市也不完全一样,要作具体的分析。能不能找出一个解决的办法,我想是可以找到的,只要我们真正从党性出发,从阶级的利益出发,从国家的利益出发,从社会主义的利益、从无产阶级专政的利益出发,而不是从小团体,不是从派性出发,我们就能够找到共同的解决问题的办法。否则那就很难了,总是有人挑动,有人出坏主意。如果我和姚文元,我们两个在上海,我们两个都是有私心杂念,搞点小动作,那上海分裂很容易。随时可以分裂,现在也可以分裂,我们有许多组织内部矛盾多得很,整天有,我们两个在那里每天随时可以挑起武斗,随时可以挑起两派打架,我们可以随时挑那个组织冲解放军,很容易的。我们不干,因为我们没有什么个人的私利。我觉得到会的,除了群众组织的负责人以外,还有部队的同志,地方的同志。特别是部队的同志,要很好的考虑这个问题,不要在那里考虑,哎呀,我过去说过什么,支持过什么,那样完全不是站在党的立场上,那是错误的。你们站在党的立场上来考虑一下嘛。蚌埠铁路工人,我和姚文元同志好心好意叫到上海。我们希望上海铁路局管辖的四个分局能够首先实现大联合,结果南京分局,杭州分局,上海分局联合了,就是蚌埠联合不起来,为什么?说要解决蚌埠革命委员会以后,你们那个地方局部利益就那么重要?上海一月革命的精神,就是党性不是派性。恰恰是为了把铁路搞通,把码头恢复起来,工人挺身而出,而你们就可以为了自己的派性把铁路断掉,火车不通,这本来威胁党、威胁人民,向党中央施加压力,这那里是工人阶级大公无私的精神?你们首先是学习上海怎样夺权的,是学习上海工人阶级把党的阶级利益放在第一位的革命精神,上海一月革命的实质。我觉得是这样:为了无产阶级专政的利益,为了加强无产阶级专政,为了把社会主义经济搞好,为了把无产阶级文化大革命搞到底来夺权的,不是为了私人利益,不是为了小团体,谁也不能曲解一月革命的实质。说我那个地方就是一月革命,我觉得不是上海一月革命的精神。上海工人阶级可贵的地方,可爱的地方,就是他们不愧为毛主席教养出来的无产阶级战士。我希望安徽的各派都考虑一下这个问题,你们的形势已经很好了,但总有人要破坏这个形势的,总有人要制造障碍,当然他们要制造就制造吧,最后总是要倒霉的,人民总是要前进的,无产阶级总是要前进的,社会主义总是要前进的。谁想破坏大联合,谁想走相反的路,以至制造分裂,破坏三结合,使得群众、干部和解放军之间不是逐渐亲密,而是分裂他们,这种人最后总是要倒霉。我们希望安徽的革命造反派能够坚持毛主席的无产阶级革命路线,把现在的形势搞得更好,希望你们能够早一点建立起真正是有代表性的有无产阶级权威的,这样的革命委员会。

安徽非常重要,是咽喉要道啊,打仗的时候重要的战场。现在形势很好,希望更好。我就简单的说这一点意见,讲得不对的,请同志们批评。



康生同志讲话



春桥同志讲的,上海一月革命就是一月风暴,这个情况介绍了,因为安徽在夺权的地方,两派在这个问题有不同的看法,所以上海的经验很值得大家研究参考。根据各地方的具体情况,具体看一看,看一看怎么样的问题。什么叫上海的一月风暴?什么叫上海的一月革命?什么叫上海的夺权?这里边春桥同志讲的很清楚。第一条,不是站在派性方面夺权,去解决夺权问题,而是站在无产阶级党性方面,站在一月革命的革命性方面,站在社会主义、无产阶级专政方面,从这里出发去搞好革命委员会。革命委员会它是一种过渡的政权形式,它不是群众团体的联合会,也不是一派几个组织的联合,它是政权性质,它对当地有公民权的公民要负责的。所以,如果用派性来解决这个问题,那自己本身就会否定自己革命委员会的作用,就会否定这种无产阶级政权的权力机构,这是一点,大家考虑。第二个问题,从春桥同志介绍的五次夺权经过五次反复,其中有什么问题呢?就是毛主席所总结的,中央贺电所指出了的,就是实现了革命的大联合,首先是革命的罗,当然我们不同意反革命联合。但是第二条是什么呢?不是小联合,不是宗派性联合,是大联合的,这是夺权当中的一个大方向问题。他是革命的大联合。是革命的大联合,还是宗派的小联合?所谓大联合不是小联合,这是重要问题,上海的经验,大家知道,要实现夺权,要实现革命委员会,就必须有个条件,就是实现革命的大联合。如果不是那样,权不能巩固,也不能够行使这个权力,其结果就必然造成两派或者几派的大分裂,结果就不能大联合,结果就是大分裂,结果不能真正的建立绝大多数人拥护的革命委员会,结果这个夺权,必然造成派别,分裂武斗,阻碍着革命的大联合,也阻碍着革命委员会的实现。所以这是上海的两条经验。同志们,这个问题,提请你们考虑一下,这个问题具体分析一下,各派都去掉派性,从党性方面具体分析一下。比如说,我夺走资派的权,那倒错了吗?那不是革命行动吗?大方向错了吗?如果仅从这个问题讲,那当然没有错,向走资派斗争,夺走资派的权,那怎么会错呢?但这仅仅是问题的一个方面,这个问题不全面的。夺权是具体的斗争问题,你用什么方法夺权,这里有方针问题,有方向问题,是各派组织大联合夺权,这里有方针问题,所以夺权,对夺走资派的权来讲,它是革命的,当然个别让的,让权那是个别的,对夺走资派的权来讲,大方向是对的,但对人民来讲,对革命的群众组织来讲,一派夺权不是大联合夺权,这个方向就不对了。同时,毛主席不是经常讲吗,动机和效果问题,马克思主义者,共产党员认为动机与效果是统一论者,你们学习了文艺座谈会上的讲话,只讲动机不讲效果是唯心主义,只讲效果不讲动机是机械唯物主义,马克思主义者,是动机效果统一论者,拿这个观点我们来看一看,动机虽然是好的,效果怎么样,搞起来是大分裂,同时,就要具体的分析一下,夺权这一派,那么反夺权的一派也要分析,不能笼统的说假夺权,个别的有不好的人,或者是个别的头头,也不能是这样,如果这样讲,就把广大群众的革命积极性否定了,仅仅强调这一方面是不对的。当然反对他们夺权因为没有联合自己,这是对的,但完全否定那一面,也就阻碍着实现革命的大联合的,所以这个问题,我们只能从这么一方面介绍这么一点经验。你们去看你们各地的情况,所以最关键最关键的问题是春桥同志讲的,去掉派性,增强党性,这个问题就能看清楚。不能因为这个问题,成为革命大联合的阻碍,各地方要我们讲讲话,具体的我们没有调查,不仅靠你们代表,主要靠你们家里的群众讨论。具体的不能光强调一面,这样派性阻碍大联合,所以春桥同志具体的讲一讲一月风暴是怎么一回事。个别的同志说,否定了一月风暴的精神,实际上有的同志对一月风暴还没有完全了解,不知道是怎么一回事。所以这个东西两个方面去检查一下。两方面还是根据批评和自我批评,在毛主席新的指示下去解决这个问题,这也是容易解决的。所以我们简单的说这一点,供同志们研究各地的情况。主要的靠你们去解决,解决的办法,要拿毛主席的革命路线,用党性来解决(此时蚌埠铁红总“屁派”代表起来读保证书)。你们要向上海的无产阶级兄弟学习。已经六点钟了,下面严光同志、宋文同志要作检讨。严光同志,大概要多少时间?严光同志?(严光同志起立答:一个多小时)恐怕时间不行了,我们还有一个会,念书面的还是另外找个时间?严光同志,恐怕时间来不及了。另外找一个时间,看大家意见怎么样?(众答:同意)书面的大家都看过了吧?(有的屁派代表答:没有看到。省军区造反派一代表说:越检查态度越不老实,越检查越坏),康老接着说,要把最近的检查多印一些发给大家,当然大家可以提意见。还是根据毛主席最新指示的精神,允许人家改正错误,让人家认识问题一步一步么,有时候要等待一下。当然同志们有意见是可以理解的。不过你们在小会上也说过,中会上也说过,可以把他的检查多印几份发给大家。找个时间再谈,同志们也可以研究一下这个问题。那就是一方面把印的检讨发给大家,第二再找个时间让严光、宋文同志检讨一下,这样大家赞成不赞成?(众答:赞成)那好。顺便我觉得还有个问题希望同志们注意,接到一个报告,昨天晚上在合肥演戏发生好派同六四○八部队的同志发生一点争论,不晓得好派的同志晓得不晓得这个事件?(合肥好派一代表答:不知道)这个事情不太好罗,就是好派要到军区礼堂演戏,同六四○八部队商量,六四○八部队提出演戏可以,最好不演增加两派分歧的剧目,演增加两派分歧的戏,部队就不好参加罗,因为大家现在实现大联合嘛,经过协商同意罗,说不演派性的戏,就是攻击另一派的戏。但结果演的时候,还是演了有派性的戏。所以六四○八部队的同志根据原来书面协议不好参加。这样引起矛盾,有些演员还欺侮我们的人民解放军,骂他要滚出去等等。这个,请你们也调查一下,假如是真的话,我觉得这样不好,不符合大联合的指示,总是对革命大联合不利嘛,而且这样把矛头对十二军,这不应该的。我不是刚才讲嘛,中央、主席称赞你们大联合,甚至号召全国来学习你们的经验,你们要始终的保持这种光荣,不要去破坏这种光荣。我总觉得现在走资派、背后黑手不会退出舞台,因此千万不要受人挑拨,破坏这个大联合。所以,这一点希望同志们注意的,现在不要两方面重新挑起攻击,应该象你们在北京双方面自我批评这样的精神贯穿下去,所以有这样一个问题请你们查一下,(合肥屁派代表起来发言:这种事情在合肥发生的很严重,还有人派人到江苏了解李军长的材料)康老说:不是那样的,(芜湖屁派代表起来说:芜湖三筹处反对六四○八部队和康老等等)这样的,贯彻协议有点反复是有的,我们是要注意,但也不要把这个问题弄得破坏我们大好形势,这个靠我们代表做工作,那怕说你们修了也好,(安庆屁派代表起来说:安庆出现炮打康老、矛头指向中央文革、指向六四○八部队。王力跑不掉,王力的后台陶二世也跑不掉。淮南炮轰派代表也起来说:淮南也出现王力大字报,把矛头指向康老等等)康老说:陶二世就指我,这个你们当然要反对,但不要以为这个东西就了不起了,(合肥好派代表起来发言:昨晚在军区演戏是采排,是请部队同志审查的,如果会上对六四○八部队同志采取不好的态度是错误的,应公开检讨。我们再查一下。我们这次回去发现,合肥确实有人挑拨我们和部队的关系,说李军长是常败将军。)康老说:恰恰这个人在朝鲜打仗最好了。一句话,你们要保持毛主席给你们的荣誉。毛主席给你们的荣誉要保持。好吧,今天这样吧!(××屁派代表起来发言。)康老说:你写给我好吧!





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来源:《东方红战报》 第一○四期 东方红农业大学革命委员会政治部主办 1967年11月3日 本期四版 地址:江苏扬州

  
  
  
  

 
 
顶端 Posted: 2009-06-29 07:43 | 1 楼
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